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  <updated>2026-11-21T18:25:50.620310+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407399</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-407399</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T18:25:50.623932+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-407399</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407399"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77433</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-77433</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T18:25:50.623979+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system. From 16.1 until 16.2, the account confirmation page’s incomplete validation of the next parameter accepts protocol-relative URLs because the version 16.1 fix for CVE-2026-54724 only requires the value to start with a slash. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a confirmation URL on a trusted Kiwi TCMS hostname that redirects a user to an external site, enabling phishing and related downstream confidentiality or integrity impacts when the user follows the link. This issue is fixed in version 16.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77433"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcwf-c25f-p9rv</id>
    <title>GHSA-gcwf-c25f-p9rv — Kiwi TCMS account confirmation open redirect through protocol-relative URLs</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T18:25:50.624039+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: kiwitcms</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>In Kiwi TCMS version 16.1, the fix for CVE-2026-54724 (open redirect via unvalidated `next` parameter) in the account confirmation endpoint is incomplete. The validation uses `startswith("/")` to check if the redirect URL is local, but this is bypassed by protocol-relative URLs like `//evil.com` which start with `/` but redirect the browser to an external attacker-controlled domain. 16.1’s incomplete mitigation still allows protocol-relative destinations and earlier releases lack the mitigation.</p>
<p>## Vulnerable Code</p>
<p>In `tcms/kiwi_auth/views.py`, the `Confirm` view (line ~113):</p>
<p>def get_redirect_url(self, *args, **kwargs):
        self.url = self.request.GET.get("next", reverse("core-views-index"))
        if not self.url.startswith("/"):
            self.url = reverse("core-views-index")</p>
<p>The check `startswith("/")` passes for `//evil.com` because it begins with `/`, but browsers interpret `//evil.com` as a protocol-relative URL that redirects to `https://evil.com` (or `http://evil.com` depending on the current page's protocol).</p>
<p>## Proof of Concept</p>
<p>GET /confirm/&lt;activation_key&gt;/?next=//evil.com/phishing HTTP/1.1
    Host: kiwi.example.com</p>
<p>Response:</p>
<p>HTTP/1.1 302 Found
    Location: //evil.com/phishing</p>
<p>The browser follows the redirect to `https://evil.com/phishing`.</p>
<p>Verification:</p>
<p>&gt;&gt;&gt; url = "//evil.com/phishing"
    &gt;&gt;&gt; url.startswith("/")
    True  # passes the check!</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>An attacker can craft a confirmation link that, after the user…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcwf-c25f-p9rv"/>
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