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  <updated>2026-11-22T21:15:54.098097+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409040</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-409040</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T21:15:54.100532+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-409040</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409040"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76818</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-76818</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T21:15:54.100568+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Axon is an agent-agnostic context engine that gives AI coding agents continuous memory across sessions, tools, and machines. Prior to 0.1.1, rtk-install in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py uses _http_download() to fetch a prebuilt rtkx release archive and _extract_binary() to mark it executable, after which compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it without verifying a checksum, signature, or build attestation. If the sammyjdev/rtkx release pipeline or maintainer release credentials are compromised, an attacker can supply a modified binary that executes with the Axon process privileges when a user installs or automatically bootstraps rtkx. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76818"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7</id>
    <title>GHSA-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7 — Axon: Download of Code Without Integrity Check in axon-mcp</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T21:15:54.100610+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: axon-mcp</p>
<p>### Summary
axon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity — no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.</p>
<p>### Details
The download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:</p>
<p>- _http_download() fetches the release archive over HTTPS via urllib.request.urlopen() and writes the raw response bytes to disk — no hash comparison against any published value.
- _extract_binary() unpacks the archive (zip/tar.gz) and sets the executable bit (out.chmod(... S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)), again with no verification step.
- There is no reference to checksum, sha256, verify, signature, gpg, cosign, or sigstore anywhere in this file.</p>
<p>The binary is not dead code — it's on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:</p>
<p>`
result = subprocess.run(
    [path, "read", str(tmp_path)],
    capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds,
)`</p>
<p>### PoC
This is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7"/>
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