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  <updated>2026-10-05T18:33:49.929998+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-373722</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-373722</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T18:33:49.979108+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-373722</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-373722"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76802</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-76802</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T18:33:49.979154+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Nuclei is a vulnerability scanner built on a simple YAML-based DSL. From 3.0.0 until 3.10.0, the DAST template loading branch does not apply the unsigned code-template signature check before accepting a template that contains both a fuzzing: block and an unsigned code: block. When an operator enables -dast, an untrusted multiprotocol template can place an unsigned code request into the execution queue and run arbitrary shell commands even without -code or a valid cryptographic signature. The issue affects CLI DAST scans and SDK integrations that enable DAST while accepting attacker-supplied templates. This issue is fixed in version 3.10.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76802"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jpf4-98qj-qr67</id>
    <title>GHSA-jpf4-98qj-qr67 — Nuclei: Arbitrary Command Execution via DAST Code Signature Bypass</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T18:33:49.979207+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3</p>
<p>A vulnerability in Nuclei's DAST template loading path allows unsigned `code:` protocol templates to execute, bypassing the cryptographic signature requirement that is meant to prevent arbitrary command execution from untrusted templates.</p>
<p>**Affected Component**</p>
<p>The issue is in the template loader's DAST loading branch. When `-dast` is enabled and a template contains a `fuzzing:` block, the loader accepted the template through a code path that omitted the unsigned-code-template signature check present in the normal loading branch.</p>
<p>**Description**</p>
<p>Nuclei requires `code:` protocol templates to be cryptographically signed before execution. Unsigned code templates are normally skipped with a warning. However, when a template combined a `fuzzing:` block (making it DAST-eligible) with an unsigned `code:` block, enabling `-dast` routed the template through the DAST loader branch, which did not enforce signature verification.</p>
<p>For multiprotocol templates containing both HTTP and `code:` blocks, the unsigned code request was included in the execution queue regardless of whether `-code` was set. This allowed arbitrary shell command execution from an unsigned `code:` block with only `-dast` enabled.</p>
<p>&gt; [!NOTE]
Both DAST mode (`-dast`) and code-protocol templates are disabled by default. Code templates normally require both the `-code` flag and a valid template signature. This issue bypassed the signature and `-code` controls only when `-dast` was explicitly enabled.</p>
<p>**Affected User…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jpf4-98qj-qr67"/>
  </entry>
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