https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-08T06:30:44.987755+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352757 EUVD-2026-352757 2026-10-08T06:30:45.043545+00:00 EUVD-2026-352757 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72802 fkie_cve-2026-72802 2026-10-08T06:30:45.043588+00:00

SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the resolveAssetPath endpoint that returns absolute filesystem paths unmodified to CheckAuth-only requests. Attackers can harvest relative asset paths from published documents and submit them to resolveAssetPath to obtain the server's absolute workspace path, disclosing the operating-system username and installation layout.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jv8v-xq2h-657v GHSA-jv8v-xq2h-657v — SiYuan: Absolute filesystem path and OS username disclosure via resolveAssetPath 2026-10-08T06:30:45.043626+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72802](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72802).

### Summary

`POST /api/asset/resolveAssetPath` returns the resolved **absolute** filesystem path of an asset, unmodified. The route is `CheckAuth`-only, so it is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. An anonymous reader who knows any asset's relative path trivially harvested from an `<img src="assets/…">` in any published document receives the server's absolute workspace path, disclosing the operating-system username and the installation layout.

### Details

```go // kernel/api/asset.go: resolveAssetPath p, err := model.GetAssetAbsPathInBox(path, "") // boxID="" → absolute workspace path ... ret.Data = p // returned raw, no stripping ```

`GetAssetAbsPathInBox(path, "")` resolves under `util.DataDir` / `util.WorkspaceDir`, producing a full host path such as `C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\data\assets\foo.png` or `/home/<user>/…`. The handler returns it directly with no redaction and no publish-scope check.

**This is data the project already treats as sensitive.** `getConf` explicitly zeroes `System.WorkspaceDir`, `AppDir`, `ConfDir`, `DataDir`, and `HomeDir` when `util.IsBrowserRequest(c)`, a change made specifically to avoid leaking the username (issue #17410). `resolveAssetPath` performs no equivalent stripping, so it re-exposes precisely the values `getC…