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  <updated>2026-11-22T22:09:51.235865+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409062</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-409062</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T22:09:51.239812+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-409062</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409062"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71534</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-71534</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T22:09:51.239859+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Mareforma is a local verification layer for AI-assisted research. From 0.3.0 until 0.3.8, restore logic in mareforma/db/restore.py derives transparency_logged from the unsigned rekor.uuid field inside signature_bundle without requiring a verified claim-bound rekor_inclusions entry, so an attacker who modifies claims.toml can falsely make a claim eligible for REPLICATED convergence. The same logic resets signed claims in non-Rekor graphs from transparency_logged 1 to 0 after restore, permanently preventing convergence because no Rekor refresh is configured. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.8.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71534"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xfq4-8hf9-5h43</id>
    <title>GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43 — Mareforma: transparency_logged trusts the unsigned rekor block</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T22:09:51.239901+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mareforma</p>
<p>## What's wrong</p>
<p>During restore, `transparency_logged` is recomputed as `1 if (toml_logged is not False and bundle_has_rekor) else 0`, where `bundle_has_rekor` comes only from a `rekor.uuid` field inside `signature_bundle`. That derivation is wrong in both directions.</p>
<p>First, the rekor block is metadata attached after signing (`attach_rekor_entry` in `mareforma/signing/rekor.py` leaves the payload and signatures untouched), so it is not covered by the Ed25519 signature. A hand-edited `claims.toml` can add `"rekor": {"uuid": "x"}` to any claim's bundle and forge the "publicly witnessed by Rekor" state. The claim signature still verifies, and restore never cross-checks the block against `[rekor_inclusions]` or the log. Tampering with `claims.toml` is the exact threat model restore defends against; `_verify_claim_signatures_on_restore` checks only payload and signatures.</p>
<p>Second, a signed claim in a graph that never used Rekor is written with `transparency_logged=1` (the column default when Rekor is disabled) but restores as 0 because its bundle has no rekor block. The convergence gate requires `transparency_logged = 1`, so post-restore peers can no longer converge to REPLICATED. With no `rekor_url` configured, `refresh_unsigned()` is a no-op and the flag stays 0 forever. Observed on the honest path: signed non-Rekor claim restores from `transparency_logged=1` to 0, and a subsequent peer stays at PRELIMINARY instead of converging.</p>
<p>## Severity and impact</p>
<p>**High.** An attacker…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xfq4-8hf9-5h43"/>
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