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  <updated>2026-11-22T21:58:06.225174+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409064</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-409064</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T21:58:06.228492+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-409064</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409064"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71533</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-71533</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T21:58:06.228533+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Mareforma is a local verification layer for AI-assisted research. From 0.3.7 until 0.3.8, search_claims in mareforma/db/core.py does not call _row_verified_on_read and therefore does not provide the same high-trust verification projection as query_claims. A forged or tampered REPLICATED or ESTABLISHED row that query_claims excludes can be returned by search_claims at its persisted trust level, and the missing verified marker prevents consumers from detecting that signature verification was skipped. The include_unverified option does not authorize this high-trust bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.8.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71533"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m29v-3g7g-9c63</id>
    <title>GHSA-m29v-3g7g-9c63 — Mareforma: search_claims skips verify-on-read, serving forged rows</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T21:58:06.228569+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mareforma</p>
<p>## What's wrong</p>
<p>`search_claims` never calls `_row_verified_on_read`. Its row loop applies only the PRELIMINARY-unenrolled filter, then appends the row. `query_claims` runs the same projection but additionally re-verifies REPLICATED/ESTABLISHED signatures on read (line 4023) and drops any row that fails, per the documented tamper guarantee in the comment block above it: a high-trust row whose signature does not verify is excluded from query results entirely.</p>
<p>So a tampered or forged high-trust row splits the two read paths. Any process with DB write access, or an attacker copying a genuine validation envelope onto a fresh row, can flip a row to ESTABLISHED. `query()` drops it; `search()` serves it at its persisted trust level. Verified in a runtime check against a forged ESTABLISHED row:</p>
<p>```
query() returns forged row: False
search() returns forged row: True   # support_level ESTABLISHED, 'verified' key absent
```</p>
<p>The docstring makes this worse: `search_claims` promises "the same projection as query_claims" and that the `include_unverified` filter "applies identically", so callers reasonably trust search results equally. The forged row also lacks the `verified` key entirely, so a consumer cannot tell it went unchecked.</p>
<p>## Severity and impact</p>
<p>**High.** The verify-on-read tamper exclusion is a stated trust guarantee, and search is a primary read surface. A forged ESTABLISHED finding that query correctly rejects is served by search as genuine, with no marker that verificati…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m29v-3g7g-9c63"/>
  </entry>
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