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  <updated>2026-10-06T07:41:20.378803+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-366848</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-366848</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T07:41:20.439284+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-366848</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-366848"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71416</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-71416</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T07:41:20.439324+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Headroom compresses data before the data reaches a large language model. Prior to version 0.35.0, the Headroom WebSocket server does not validate the `Origin` header of incoming client WebSocket requests before forwarding the request to the upstream server, allowing malicious WebSocket clients to perform arbitrary LLM requests without authentication. This can be exploited by a malicious WebSocket client executed in a traditional or headless browser such as lightpanda, if the browser has access to the Headroom proxy and the OpenAI API key is stored in the `OPENAI_API_KEY` environment variable. Version 0.35.0 fixes the issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71416"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h46j-26q3-rggf</id>
    <title>GHSA-h46j-26q3-rggf — Headroom vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T07:41:20.439360+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: headroom-ai</p>
<p>### Summary
The Headroom WebSocket server does not validate the `Origin` header of incoming client WebSocket requests before forwarding the request to the upstream server, allowing malicious WebSocket clients to perform arbitrary LLM requests without authentication. This can be exploited by a malicious WebSocket client executed in a traditional or headless browser such as lightpanda, if the browser has access to the Headroom proxy and the OpenAI API key is stored in the `OPENAI_API_KEY` environment variable.</p>
<p>### Details
The Headroom server defines a WebSocket handler at `ws://&lt;headroom_host&gt;:8787/v1/responses` in `headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py`:
```python
    @app.websocket("/v1/responses")
    async def openai_responses_ws(websocket: WebSocket):
        await proxy.handle_openai_responses_ws(websocket)
```
In the `handle_openai_responses_ws()` method of the `OpenAIHandlerMixin` class, the `Origin` header of the WebSocket client handshake is not checked or verified before calling `websocket.accept()`, which grants any WebSocket client (including malicious clients) access to the server:
```python
    async def handle_openai_responses_ws(self, websocket: WebSocket) -&gt; None:
        """WebSocket proxy for /v1/responses (Codex gpt-5.4+).</p>
<p>Newer Codex versions use WebSocket instead of HTTP POST for the
        Responses API.  This handler:
        1. Accepts the client WebSocket
        2. Receives the first message (``response.create`` request)
        3. Opens an…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h46j-26q3-rggf"/>
  </entry>
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