https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-06T05:49:20.352876+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349664 EUVD-2026-349664 2026-10-06T05:49:20.402797+00:00 EUVD-2026-349664 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71272 fkie_cve-2026-71272 2026-10-06T05:49:20.402840+00:00

Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w8cc-xr9f-mrh7 GHSA-w8cc-xr9f-mrh7 2026-10-06T05:49:20.402877+00:00

Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection.