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  <updated>2026-10-08T00:25:27.065766+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349646</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-349646</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T00:25:27.067935+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-349646</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349646"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71250</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-71250</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T00:25:27.067966+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Firefly III's webhook URL validator (IsValidWebhookUrl.php) filters most private/reserved IPv4 ranges but contains an explicit early-return that allows any resolved address in 127.0.0.0/8, permitting an authenticated user (with webhooks enabled, which is off by default) to configure a webhook targeting loopback services on the server.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71250"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q8pq-98hq-mg7f</id>
    <title>GHSA-q8pq-98hq-mg7f</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T00:25:27.067998+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Firefly III's webhook URL validator (IsValidWebhookUrl.php) filters most private/reserved IPv4 ranges but contains an explicit early-return that allows any resolved address in 127.0.0.0/8, permitting an authenticated user (with webhooks enabled, which is off by default) to configure a webhook targeting loopback services on the server. Additionally, the validator resolves the target hostname once via gethostbyname() at validation time, but the actual outbound request (StandardWebhookSender.php, via Guzzle) re-resolves the hostname independently at send time, allowing a DNS-rebinding attacker to pass validation against a public IP and have the real request delivered to a private or internal address. The webhook response body is only written to a server-side debug log, not returned to the triggering user, so this is a blind SSRF primitive rather than one with direct response read-back.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q8pq-98hq-mg7f"/>
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