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  <updated>2026-10-06T17:08:32.639306+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349622</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-349622</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T17:08:32.690668+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-349622</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349622"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71210</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-71210</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T17:08:32.690718+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Mealie's AsyncSafeTransport SSRF guard (mealie/pkgs/safehttp/transport.py) resolves a target hostname once, checks the resolved IP against private-range rules, but then issues the actual outbound HTTP request using the original hostname, which the underlying async transport re-resolves independently.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71210"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q2c2-jwjg-8cxx</id>
    <title>GHSA-q2c2-jwjg-8cxx</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T17:08:32.690768+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Mealie's AsyncSafeTransport SSRF guard (mealie/pkgs/safehttp/transport.py) resolves a target hostname once, checks the resolved IP against private-range rules, but then issues the actual outbound HTTP request using the original hostname, which the underlying async transport re-resolves independently. Because the validated IP is never pinned to the actual connection, a DNS-rebinding attacker (returning a public IP to the validation lookup and a private/metadata IP to the real connection) defeats the guard. This is reachable by any authenticated user via /api/recipes/create/url, /api/recipes/test-scrape-url, and /api/recipes/{slug}/image, and the scraper reflects fetched content back to the requester, allowing an authenticated user to read internal HTTP services and cloud-metadata endpoints.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q2c2-jwjg-8cxx"/>
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