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  <updated>2026-10-07T01:41:25.056248+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368144</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-368144</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:41:25.103433+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-368144</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368144"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70658</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-70658</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:41:25.103507+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Pay is a payments engine for Ruby on Rails 6.0 and higher. Prior to 11.6.2, Pay::Webhooks::PaddleBillingController#valid_signature? in app/controllers/pay/webhooks/paddle_billing_controller.rb compares the computed 64-character SHA-256 HMAC with the attacker-controlled h1 token from the Paddle-Signature header using Ruby String#==. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can repeatedly submit requests to /pay/webhooks/paddle_billing and obtain sufficiently precise timing measurements can infer matching digest prefixes and recover a valid signature. A forged accepted webhook is enqueued through Pay::Webhooks::ProcessJob and can cause a host application to update billing state, provision paid features, record refunds, or trigger customer notifications. This issue is fixed in version 11.6.2.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70658"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mjgf-xj26-9qf9</id>
    <title>GHSA-mjgf-xj26-9qf9 — pay-rails/pay: non-constant-time HMAC comparison in Paddle Billing webhook signature verifier</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:41:25.103543+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> RubyGems: pay</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`Pay::Webhooks::PaddleBillingController#valid_signature?` (`app/controllers/pay/webhooks/paddle_billing_controller.rb`) verifies the Paddle Billing webhook signature by computing `OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(...)` and comparing it to the attacker-supplied header value using Ruby's `String#==`. Ruby's `==` is non-constant-time — it returns as soon as the first byte mismatches — and exposes a per-byte timing side channel on the webhook signature verification path. The canonical mitigation is to use a constant-time primitive (`OpenSSL.fixed_length_secure_compare` / `ActiveSupport::SecurityUtils.secure_compare`).</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>- **CWE-208** — Observable Timing Discrepancy on the webhook signature verifier.
- An attacker who can deliver requests to the `/pay/webhooks/paddle_billing` mount point can probe the verifier with guessed `Paddle-Signature` header values. Because `String#==` short-circuits on the first mismatching byte, the response-time distribution shifts as the prefix of the guess matches the real hex digest.
- A signature recovered through the oracle lets the attacker deliver forged Paddle Billing webhook events (e.g. `subscription.created` / `transaction.completed`) against the host application. Pay's webhook processor enqueues a `Pay::Webhooks::ProcessJob` for any accepted webhook, which downstream applications use to update billing state — including provisioning paid features, recording refunds, and triggering customer notifications.
- The endpoint is interne…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mjgf-xj26-9qf9"/>
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