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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-13T07:14:55.324694+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348600</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-348600</title>
    <updated>2026-10-13T07:14:55.327642+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-348600</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-348600"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70485</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-70485</title>
    <updated>2026-10-13T07:14:55.327672+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.0 until 0.11.0, Open WebUI checked whether a user-supplied URL destination was globally routable by applying ipaddress.is_global to the literal IPv6 address without examining IPv4 addresses embedded in transition encodings. On a deployment with a NAT64 gateway, any verified user could wrap an internal or cloud-metadata IPv4 address in the NAT64 well-known prefix, pass the filter, and receive the internal response body through RAG URL ingestion, URL-to-markdown conversion, or web-search content retrieval. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70485"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8x5v-cpv7-8jjp</id>
    <title>GHSA-8x5v-cpv7-8jjp — Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach internal services and cloud metadata via NAT64-encoded URLs</title>
    <updated>2026-10-13T07:14:55.327703+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Open WebUI fetches user-supplied URLs on the server for RAG URL ingestion, URL-to-markdown conversion and web-search content retrieval, and decides whether a destination is allowed by asking whether its IP address is globally routable. That test operates on the literal IPv6 address and does not look at the IPv4 address embedded inside it. On a deployment whose network has a NAT64 gateway, any verified user can wrap an internal or cloud-metadata IPv4 address in the NAT64 well-known prefix, pass the filter, and receive the internal response body back through the API.</p>
<p>## Preconditions</p>
<p>- Any verified (authenticated) user account. No admin role, no elevated permission.
- Default configuration: `ENABLE_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH` off, the default `WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST` metadata blocklist in place. Neither prevents this, because the blocklist matches hostname strings and the NAT64 literal is not one of them.
- The deployment's network must provide NAT64 translation for the well-known `64:ff9b::/96` prefix, which is the common default on IPv6-only and dual-stack cloud and Kubernetes networks.
- Deployments on IPv4-only networks, or on any network without a NAT64 gateway, are not affected: the address has nowhere to route.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>On an affected network a low-privilege user can read GET responses from services the server can reach but the internet cannot: cloud instance metadata including IAM role credentials, loopback-bound admin surfaces, and internal APIs in the same VPC o…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8x5v-cpv7-8jjp"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3645</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3645 — Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach internal services and cloud metadata via NAT64-encoded URLs</title>
    <updated>2026-10-13T07:14:55.327803+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Open WebUI fetches user-supplied URLs on the server for RAG URL ingestion, URL-to-markdown conversion and web-search content retrieval, and decides whether a destination is allowed by asking whether its IP address is globally routable. That test operates on the literal IPv6 address and does not look at the IPv4 address embedded inside it. On a deployment whose network has a NAT64 gateway, any verified user can wrap an internal or cloud-metadata IPv4 address in the NAT64 well-known prefix, pass the filter, and receive the internal response body back through the API.</p>
<p>## Preconditions</p>
<p>- Any verified (authenticated) user account. No admin role, no elevated permission.
- Default configuration: `ENABLE_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH` off, the default `WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST` metadata blocklist in place. Neither prevents this, because the blocklist matches hostname strings and the NAT64 literal is not one of them.
- The deployment's network must provide NAT64 translation for the well-known `64:ff9b::/96` prefix, which is the common default on IPv6-only and dual-stack cloud and Kubernetes networks.
- Deployments on IPv4-only networks, or on any network without a NAT64 gateway, are not affected: the address has nowhere to route.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>On an affected network a low-privilege user can read GET responses from services the server can reach but the internet cannot: cloud instance metadata including IAM role credentials, loopback-bound admin surfaces, and internal APIs in the same VPC o…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3645"/>
  </entry>
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