https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-08T15:50:55.116958+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292979 EUVD-2026-292979 2026-10-08T15:50:55.119532+00:00 EUVD-2026-292979 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-6966 fkie_cve-2026-6966 2026-10-08T15:50:55.119564+00:00

Improper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata.

We recommend you upgrade to tough-v0.22.0 / tuftool-v0.15.0.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8m7c-8m39-rv4x GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x — awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass 2026-10-08T15:50:55.119597+00:00

Affected: crates.io: tough, crates.io: tuftool

### Summary Improper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata.

### Impact The tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid.

### Patches This issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.

### Workarounds No workarounds to this issue are known.

### References * CVE-2026-6966

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the [vulnerability reporting page](https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting) or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.

### Acknowledgement

Amazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this i…