https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-05T18:15:57.381337+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352693 EUVD-2026-352693 2026-10-05T18:15:57.430497+00:00 EUVD-2026-352693 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69084 fkie_cve-2026-69084 2026-10-05T18:15:57.430534+00:00

SiYuan versions <= v3.7.2 expose the /api/search/searchEmbedBlock endpoint, which passes a client-supplied SQL statement verbatim to the main read-write siyuan.db handle with no single-statement, read-only, or admin restrictions. The endpoint is gated only by CheckAuth, making it reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by anonymous users when publish authentication is disabled. Because the underlying driver executes stacked statements, an attacker can read and modify content across all opened cleartext notebooks (encrypted per-box notebooks are excluded). Fixed in v3.7.3.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vh22-h7hf-www7 GHSA-vh22-h7hf-www7 — SiYuan: Unauthenticated arbitrary SQL execution via searchEmbedBlock (publish mode) : reader-reachable raw statement on… 2026-10-05T18:15:57.430570+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-69084](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69084).

### Summary

The `/api/search/searchEmbedBlock` endpoint passes a client-supplied SQL statement verbatim to the database with no validation. The endpoint is gated by `CheckAuth` only reachable by the publish RoleReader token, and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. The statement runs on the main read-write `siyuan.db` handle through a driver that executes stacked statements, with no single-statement or read-only guard. An unauthenticated request can therefore execute arbitrary SQL reading and writing content across all cleartext notebooks.

Unlike SQL injection into a fixed query, this endpoint accepts a full SQL statement by design and simply fails to restrict who may call it or what the statement may do.

### Details

Data flow verbatim, unvalidated:

- `searchEmbedBlock` (`kernel/api/search.go`): `stmt := arg["stmt"].(string)` passed directly to `model.SearchEmbedBlock(stmt, …)`. No validation. - `SearchEmbedBlock` → `SearchEmbedBlockInBox` → `sql.SelectBlocksRawStmtNoParse(stmt, …)` → `selectBlocksRawStmt` → `query(stmt)`. - `query()` (`kernel/sql/database.go`) calls `db.Query(stmt)` on the global `siyuan.db` handle.

**Missing guards.** The comparable endpoints enforce restrictions this one omits: - `/api/query/sql` runs `CheckSingleStatement` (all modes) and `CheckReadonlyStatement` (readonly mode) and is route-gated `CheckAuth + Ch…