Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-343742

2026-10-09T22:38:52.744751+00:00

EUVD-2026-343742

fkie_cve-2026-67309

2026-10-09T22:38:52.744789+00:00

Traefik versions >= v3.7.0 and <= v3.7.7 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider's RewriteTarget middleware (generated from the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target annotation). When an Ingress path uses a regex that captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator (e.g., path /api(.*) with rewrite target /$1), a crafted request such as /api../admin matches the public router, is rewritten to a dot-segment traversal path (/../admin), and is forwarded without post-replacement normalization validation. A backend that normalizes dot segments resolves the path to a protected endpoint (e.g., /admin) reachable only through a separate router secured with BasicAuth, DigestAuth, or ForwardAuth, resulting in route-level authentication bypass. The issue is fixed in v3.7.8.

GHSA-8rxv-jg7p-wvg3 — Traefik: Kubernetes Ingress NGINX RewriteTarget Path Traversal Allows Route-Level Authentication Bypass

2026-10-09T22:38:52.744827+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/traefik/traefik/v3

## Summary

There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider. When an Ingress uses the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target` annotation with a regular expression that captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator (for example path `/api(.*)` with rewrite target `/$1`), the generated `RewriteTarget` middleware can turn an initially safe request path into a dot-segment traversal path after the router has already been selected.

## Patches

- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.8

## For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).

Original Description

## Summary

Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider creates an internal `RewriteTarget` middleware for the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target` annotation. When an Ingress path captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator, the middleware can turn an initially safe path into a dot-segment traversal path after Traefik has already selected the router.

For example, with Ingress path `/api(.*)` and rewrite target `/$1`, an unauthenticated request to `/api../admin` follows this flow:

1. The default entry-point path sanitizer leaves `/api../admin` unchanged because `api..` is one ordinary segment. 2. The public router's `PathRegexp("(?i)^/api(.*)")` rule matches. 3. `RewriteTarget` capture…