<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-05T23:40:46.603129+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-344042</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-344042</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T23:40:46.638584+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-344042</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-344042"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-66883</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-66883</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T23:40:46.638633+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.Authorize module) renders the user agent session binding inert, removing a defense in depth control against replay of a stolen session.</p>
<p>This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/oidcc/plug/authorize.ex and lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex, and program routines Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 and Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2.</p>
<p>Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 reads the initiating client's user agent with get_req_header(conn, "User-Agent"). Plug lowercases incoming header names, but get_req_header/2 matches the supplied key exactly and performs no normalization of its own, so the mixed-case lookup always returns an empty list and nil is written into the session. On the callback side, Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback treats a stored nil user agent as nothing to compare and returns :ok without inspecting the request. The two behaviours combine so that the check passes unconditionally on every request, including for deployments that explicitly opted in with check_useragent: true, and an authorization callback can be completed from a different user agent than the one that initiated the flow without detection. The check fails open silently, with no error and no log entry, so a deployment cannot tell the binding is absent.</p>
<p>The impact is limited to defense in depth. The inert check does not by itself allow an attacker to complete an authorization flow; i…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-66883"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
