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EUVD-2026-348553

2026-10-02T09:59:06.842372+00:00

EUVD-2026-348553

fkie_cve-2026-66065

2026-10-02T09:59:06.842412+00:00

Ouroboros is a local-first runtime for AI coding agents that records their actions and applies user-defined policies to constrain behavior. Versions prior to 0.42.1 have an incomplete denylist. Several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a .env (auto-loaded at import, with no review step). The CVE-2026-47211 fix added _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST to stop an untrusted project-directory .env from redirecting execution, but it did not account for all keys. The backend config-home and MCP/plugin roots bypass the approval gate by pointing the nested agent, MCP servers, and plugin roster at attacker config. Other variables re-enable blocked local transports, replace sub-agent prompts, switch backends, and lower tool approval classes, further weakening the approval gate. This issue has been fixed in version 0.42.1.

GHSA-jv2h-4p9v-wf5w — ouroboros-ai: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-47211: untrusted project .env can still reach RCE via omitted execution-routin…

2026-10-02T09:59:06.842450+00:00

Affected: PyPI: ouroboros-ai

### Impact The CVE-2026-47211 fix (0.39.0) added `_UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST` to stop an untrusted project-directory `.env` from redirecting execution. The denylist was incomplete — several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a `.env` (auto-loaded at import, no review step):

- **Backend config-home roots** `CODEX_HOME`, `OPENCODE_CONFIG`, `OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR`, `XDG_CONFIG_HOME`: a spawned vendor CLI resolves its config from these. `CODEX_HOME=./.evil` + committed `./.evil/config.toml` redirects the nested Codex agent to attacker config — `mcp_servers..command/args` (RCE) and `approval_policy="never"` / `sandbox_mode="danger-full-access"` (silent removal of the human approval gate). (reported by matte1782) - **MCP bridge / plugin execution roster** `OUROBOROS_MCP_CONFIG` (the YAML's server `command`/`args` are spawned via stdio_client — RCE), `OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_LOCKFILE`, `OUROBOROS_PLUGIN_TRUST_ROOT` (redirect the installed-plugin roster / trust root so `ooo ` dispatches into attacker code). (reported by hackkim) - **SSRF guard toggle** `OUROBOROS_ALLOW_LOCAL_TRANSPORT` (re-enables loopback/private MCP transport targets). - **Instruction / capability roots** `OUROBOROS_AGENTS_DIR`, `COPILOT_CUSTOM_INSTRUCTIONS_DIRS` (replace spawned sub-agent role prompts), `OUROBOROS_RUNTIME_PROFILE` (backend selector), `OUROBOROS_TOOL_CAPABILITIES` (override YAML can lower a…