<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-07T22:21:21.962472+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352272</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-352272</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T22:21:21.993358+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-352272</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352272"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-66060</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-66060</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T22:21:21.993394+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy.  Prior to 2026.5.3,  the Companion app treats tag links (NFC or QR) delivered through an OS-level routing mechanism as if they were physically scanned, without validating the calling app or prompting the user. As a result, any untrusted app on the device can forward an arbitrary tag to Home Assistant, causing it to execute the associated automation as though a legitimate user had scanned an authorized tag. This allows silent, unattended automation execution by untrusted local callers. This issue is fixed in version 2026.8.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-66060"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
