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  <updated>2026-11-17T05:28:51.778767+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405073</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-405073</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T05:28:51.780708+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-405073</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405073"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64855</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-64855</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T05:28:51.780742+00:00</updated>
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        <p>soapbar is a SOAP library for Python — client, server, and WSDL handling. Prior to version 0.13.0, verify_envelope_bsp() derived its trust anchor from the message it was verifying. It read the X.509 certificate out of the caller-untrusted wsse:BinarySecurityToken, validated only that certificate's not-before / not-after dates, and then verified the signature against that same certificate. There was no CA-chain validation, no issuer/subject allowlist, and no pinning. A successful verify_envelope_bsp() therefore proved only that the envelope was signed by whoever supplied the embedded certificate — never that it was signed by a trusted party. An attacker who mints their own certificate, signs a forged envelope, and embeds that certificate in the token passes verification. Any consumer that treats a successful BSP verification as authentication can be impersonated (signature forgery / authentication bypass). verify_envelope() (which pins a caller-supplied x509_cert) was not affected — the flaw was specific to the BSP variant whose trust anchor came from the message. This issue has been patched in version 0.13.0.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64855"/>
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