SwiftNIO HTTP/2 was missing validation on inbound HEADERS frames that let CR, LF, NUL, SP and other control characters reach an HTTP/1.1 backend through NIOHTTP2's HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 codec, enabling HTTP request smuggling or response splitting. This vulnerability is addressed in swift-nio-http2 version 1.45.0.

Affected: SwiftURL: swift-nio-http2

## Summary

SwiftNIO HTTP/2 was missing validation on inbound HEADERS frames that let CR, LF, NUL, SP and other control characters reach an HTTP/1.1 backend through NIOHTTP2's HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 codec, enabling HTTP request smuggling or response splitting.

## Impact

Two related gaps in inbound header validation, against any application using HTTP2ToHTTP1Codec (or HTTP2FramePayloadToHTTP1Codec) to front an HTTP/1.1 backend:

Regular header field values were only checked against a forbidden-name list (connection, transfer-encoding, proxy-connection, keep-alive, upgrade); the value itself was never inspected. An attacker-controlled regular header field value containing CR or LF passed validation and, once serialized as `name: value CRLF` by the codec, terminated the field early and injected extra header lines into the outbound HTTP/1.1 message.

Pseudo-header values (`:path` in particular) were only checked against CR, LF and NUL. A `:path` value containing SP serializes into the request-target of `METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF`, so a value like `/a HTTP/1.1` produces `GET /a HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1` — a parser-differential request line depending on whether a downstream reader takes the first or last SP-delimited token as the version.

Neither of these is reachable on a stock pipeline: NIOHTTP1's outbound validator (`enableOutboundHeaderValidation`, on by default) already rejects these characters on write. The exposure is pipelines that skip outbound validation, or an…