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EUVD-2026-341490

2026-10-06T08:47:27.534013+00:00

EUVD-2026-341490

fkie_cve-2026-63755

2026-10-06T08:47:27.534056+00:00

SurrealDB before 3.1.0 evaluates user-supplied WHERE clauses in SELECT statements (and SET/MERGE/CONTENT/PATCH clauses in UPDATE, UPSERT, INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE, and RELATE update-variant statements) against full record data before enforcing PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE restrictions. An authenticated user — including Record and Scope users — can exploit this ordering flaw to read the full contents of any table in the database they are authenticated against, bypassing table-level permission checks. Exfiltration is most direct when scripting functions are enabled (--allow-scripting), but is also possible via SurrealQL's THROW statement and timing-based side channels without scripting. The vulnerability is confined to the attacker's current database and does not cross namespace or database isolation boundaries.

GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c — SurrealDB: Scraping a TABLE with no available PERMISSIONS to current auth level

2026-10-06T08:47:27.534100+00:00

Affected: crates.io: surrealdb

A vulnerability was discovered where the user-supplied `WHERE` clause in a `SELECT` statement is evaluated against the full record data before `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` determines whether the principal is authorised to access that record. A side-effecting expression in the `WHERE` clause can exfiltrate record contents before the permission check runs. The same ordering bug affects the `SET`, `MERGE`, `CONTENT` and `PATCH` clauses of update-variant statements (`UPDATE`, `UPSERT-update`, `INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE`, `RELATE-update`).

This vulnerability is confined to the attacker's current database. It does not cross namespace or database isolation boundaries.

### Impact

An authenticated user — including Record and Scope users — can read the full contents of any table in the database they are authenticated against, bypassing `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` restrictions on those tables.

The most direct exfiltration method requires scripting functions to be enabled (`--allow-scripting` / `-A`). However, exfiltration via SurrealQL's `THROW` statement is also feasible without scripting functions, and timing-based side-channel extraction is possible in all configurations.

All tables within the attacker's current database, regardless of table-level `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` restrictions on those tables, are vulnerable to this attack. Tables in other databases within the same namespace, or within other namespaces, are not vulnerable.

### Patches

A patch has been…