SurrealDB versions 3.1.0 before 3.1.5 fail to enforce field-level SELECT permissions when records are accessed through graph-edge or back-reference traversals. Attackers with table-level SELECT access can read field values hidden by field-level permissions by materializing records through graph traversals instead of direct table scans.

Affected: crates.io: surrealdb

A record user could read field values hidden from them by field-level SELECT permissions by reaching the records through a graph-edge (`->`) or back-reference (`<~`) traversal instead of a direct `SELECT`.

When a table was readable at the table level but carried a field hidden by a field-level permission (`DEFINE FIELD secret ON knows PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE`), a direct `SELECT * FROM knows` hid `secret` — but reaching the same records through a traversal that yields full objects — `person:bob->(SELECT * FROM knows)`, `person:bob<~(SELECT * FROM comment)`, or a projected target vertex `->knows->(SELECT * FROM person)` — returned it intact.

The root cause: the shared `resolve_record_batch` helper used by `GraphEdgeScan` (`FullEdge`) and `ReferenceScan` (`FullRecord`) enforced only the table-level SELECT permission and pushed raw record data, never running the field-level filtering (`build_field_state` / `filter_fields_by_permission`) that ordinary table scans and `fetch_record` apply.

### Impact

A record user can read the values of fields hidden by field-level SELECT permissions, on tables they already hold table-level SELECT on, by materialising the records through a graph-edge, back-reference, or target-vertex traversal — recovering the values directly, for every record the traversal returns.

The disclosure is confined to the field-permission layer: it grants **no unauthorised cross-table, cross-record, or cross-namespace/database access**. The table's own SELECT p…