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  <updated>2026-11-18T14:48:45.456269+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-402597</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-402597</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T14:48:45.458504+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-402597</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-402597"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63634</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-63634</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T14:48:45.458535+00:00</updated>
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        <p>pympp is a Python SDK for the Machine Payments Protocol. Prior to version 0.9.1, when the server acts as the fee_payer, pympp validates calldata using eth_abi decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The FeePayerPolicy caps gas_limit (≤ 2 M) and max_fee_per_gas (≤ 100 Gwei) but does not check calldata length. Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: 16 gas per non-zero byte. Appending N bytes of 0x01 padding inflates actual gas used by N × 16 while keeping gas_limit and max_fee_per_gas within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63634"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v858-xh7w-8jr5</id>
    <title>GHSA-v858-xh7w-8jr5 — pympp allows excessive sponsored transaction fees through padded calldata</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T14:48:45.458569+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pympp</p>
<p>### Details
When the server acts as the fee_payer, `pympp` 0.8.0 validates calldata using `eth_abi` decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The `FeePayerPolicy` caps `gas_limit` (≤ 2 M) and `max_fee_per_gas` (≤ 100 Gwei) but does **not** check calldata length.</p>
<p>Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: **16 gas per non-zero byte**. Appending `N` bytes of `0x01` padding inflates actual gas used by `N × 16` while keeping `gas_limit` and `max_fee_per_gas` within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet.</p>
<p>**Vulnerable code path:** `FeePayerPolicy` in `fee_payer_policy.py` (pympp 0.8.0) enforces `maxGas = 2_000_000` and `maxFeePerGas = 100 Gwei` but has no `calldata.length` bound. The policy check passes because the inflated gas comes from intrinsic calldata cost, not the declared `gas_limit`.</p>
<p>**Note:** In our experiment, we enforce an 16 KB `max_header_length`, which caps the maximum effective padding at roughly 5,500 bytes. The default padding in this PoC (5,500 bytes) is within that limit.</p>
<p>### PoC
The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run:
```bash
unzip pympp_python_PoC.zip
cd pympp_python
docker build -t pympp-padding .
docker run --rm pympp-padding
``` 
There are more details in `pympp_python/README.md`</p>
<p>### Impact
In our experiment, a malicious client can force the server to pay ~**5x** the normal tran…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v858-xh7w-8jr5"/>
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