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  <updated>2026-11-17T02:28:27.238878+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399715</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-399715</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T02:28:27.241573+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-399715</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399715"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63395</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-63395</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T02:28:27.241608+00:00</updated>
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        <p>isomorphic-git is a pure JavaScript implementation of Git for Node.js and browsers. Prior to 1.38.6, isomorphic-git's git.checkout writes new child paths through symlinked leading directory components without checking them. A malicious repository can first place a directory symlink and later replace the tree state with a child file beneath that path; the usual trigger is a clone followed by a later pull, while a single clone can trigger the issue when a symlink already exists or the consuming application accesses the tree. With Node fs on Linux or macOS, the operating system can resolve the write outside the working tree, permitting arbitrary host file writes and possible code execution. Node fs on Windows usually blocks the symlink plant without additional privilege, and browser or in-memory providers limit impact to their virtual filesystem and are affected only when they implement symlink creation and following. This issue is fixed in version 1.38.6.</p>
      </div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63395"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9qw7-j9xw-fv9c</id>
    <title>GHSA-9qw7-j9xw-fv9c — isomorphic-git: Arbitrary file write outside of working tree via directory symlink during checkout (potential RCE)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T02:28:27.241644+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: isomorphic-git</p>
<p>### Summary
`git.checkout` writes working-tree files through a directory **symlink** without checking the leading path, so a malicious repository can write **outside the intended working directory**. The defect is in isomorphic-git's checkout logic itself and is therefore **independent of the `fs` provider**. The *impact* depends on the configured filesystem; worst case is arbitrary file write on the host, e.g. injecting an attacker key into `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` → remote login / code execution.</p>
<p>### Details
A single git tree can't hold a name as both a symlink and a directory, so the attack uses two states:</p>
<p>```
Commit N:    config            (mode 120000, symlink → ../.ssh)
Commit N+1:  config/           (mode 040000, tree)
               authorized_keys (mode 100644, attacker public key)
```</p>
<p>Checking out commit N writes `config` as a directory symlink. Checking out commit N+1 sees `config/authorized_keys` as a new path: isomorphic-git `mkdir`s the parent (`config`, already a symlink → `EEXIST`, ignored) then `writeFile`s the file, which the OS resolves through the symlink to outside the working directory. A *file*-level symlink swap is caught (the `120000`→`100644` mode change triggers an `rm`), but the **directory**-level variant is not — the payload is always a new child path, a plain `create`, so the parent symlink is never removed.</p>
<p>The symlink target is attacker-chosen. Besides `~/.ssh`, pointing it at the repo's own control directory — `hooks → .git/hooks` then…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9qw7-j9xw-fv9c"/>
  </entry>
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