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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-06T13:04:49.551590+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338893</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-338893</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T13:04:49.599410+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-338893</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338893"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62685</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-62685</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T13:04:49.599448+00:00</updated>
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        <p>File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.17, File Browser builds new user scopes from usernames passed through cleanUsername() when Signup=true and CreateUserDir=true, but the many-to-one normalization can collapse usernames such as team/one, team one, and team-one to the same home directory without checking whether the resulting scope is already taken, allowing a second registrant to gain full read and write access to another user's files. This issue is fixed in version 2.63.17.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62685"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7rc3-g7h6-22m7</id>
    <title>GHSA-7rc3-g7h6-22m7 — File Browser: Colliding username normalization gives two users the same home directory</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T13:04:49.599484+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>FileBrowser confines each user to a *scope*: a home directory that acts as the boundary for everything they can read or write. When self-registration and automatic home-directory creation are both enabled (`Signup=true` and `CreateUserDir=true`), a new user's scope is built from their username after it passes through `cleanUsername()`. That function rewrites the name: it strips `..` and replaces every character outside `0-9A-Za-z@_\-.` with `-`.</p>
<p>The problem is that this rewrite is **many-to-one**: different usernames can produce the same result, and FileBrowser never checks whether the resulting scope is already taken. So `team/one`, `team one`, and `team-one` all collapse to the same directory name, and whoever registers second is handed the **same home directory** as the first user instead of an isolated one.</p>
<p>This breaks per-user isolation. An attacker can pick a username that normalizes onto a victim's directory (for example registering `alice/` or `al..ice` to land in `alice`'s home) and gain full read **and** write access to that victim's files. Because username uniqueness is enforced on the raw name, both accounts coexist normally and neither user is warned that they share storage.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>**1. The home directory is built straight from the cleaned username (`settings/dir.go:30`)**</p>
<p>```go
// MakeUserDir, when CreateUserDir is true:
username = cleanUsername(username)
// ...
userScope = path.Join(s.UserHomeBasePath, username)   // line 30
userScope = pa…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7rc3-g7h6-22m7"/>
  </entry>
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