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  <updated>2026-11-17T08:27:56.882813+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-398591</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-398591</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T08:27:56.889202+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-398591</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-398591"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62297</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-62297</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T08:27:56.889239+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>ag-psd is a JavaScript library for reading and writing Photoshop Document files. Before the allocation-limit remediation attempt in version 31.0.0, `readPsd()` commits image and layer buffers from attacker-declared PSD geometry before validating the declarations against the actual available data or sane allocation limits. The `psdReader.js` implementation sizes off-heap typed arrays using `width`, `height`, `channels`, `depth` and `per-layer rectangles`, so a tiny PSD declaring enormous geometry can force multi-gigabyte memory allocation before a later bounds error. The reported 52-byte input on Node 24 produced approximately 3.17 GB peak RSS before a RangeError; under memory pressure the process can be terminated before the error can be caught, and concurrent inputs can exhaust memory. Services reading untrusted PSDs are exposed to denial of service. This differs from genuinely large PSD files whose memory demand is proportional to real input content. Version 31.0.0 adds a composite-image allocation limit, but complete coverage of the separately described layer-rectangle allocation path is not established and requires curator residual/scope review.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62297"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qfx6-q44v-9qqw</id>
    <title>GHSA-qfx6-q44v-9qqw — ag-psd can exhaust memory when parsing crafted PSD dimensions</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T08:27:56.889278+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: ag-psd</p>
<p>### Summary
readPsd() commits the image/layer buffers from the declared header geometry (width x height x channels x depth, and per-layer rectangles) before validating those values against the actual data. A tiny crafted PSD declaring huge geometry forces a multi-gigabyte allocation.</p>
<p>### Impact
On ag-psd 30.2.0, Node 24, a 52-byte PSD makes readPsd(buf) commit ~3.17 GB (measured peak RSS) in ~0.45 s before throwing a catchable RangeError ("Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView") — about 61,000,000x amplification. Because the buffer is committed before validation, the allocation OOM-kills the process before the error on essentially any host (uncatchable), and concurrent requests exhaust memory. Any service reading untrusted PSDs with ag-psd is exposed to a remote DoS.</p>
<p>This is distinct from #39 and #206, which involve genuinely large PSDs (memory proportional to real data). Here the input is 52 bytes: the file declares enormous geometry that is never present, so the allocation is driven by an unvalidated header field, not by actual content, an uncontrolled-allocation denial-of-service vulnerability, not proportional memory use.</p>
<p>### Steps to reproduce
The PoC is a 52-byte PSD (sha256 a1146a6fabdfef289472f99a56851249e7a46e8d19d4d8bf85fe833e2f0158b6). Reconstruct with:</p>
<p>base64 -d &gt; poc.psd &lt;&lt;'EOF'
    OEJQUwABAAAAAAAAAA0AADcuAAA58wAgAAMAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAdEgNZv+i9bc9ygd2A==
    EOF</p>
<p>Then (commits ~3.17 GB before throwing a catchable RangeError):</p>
<p>const { readPsd…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qfx6-q44v-9qqw"/>
  </entry>
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