https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-06T17:48:22.555459+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357585 EUVD-2026-357585 2026-10-06T17:48:22.609732+00:00 EUVD-2026-357585 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62283 fkie_cve-2026-62283 2026-10-06T17:48:22.609781+00:00

Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. Nezha versions 1.14.13 through 1.14.14 and 2.0.0 through 2.0.9 do not bind stream identifiers created by CreateStream in service/rpc/io_stream.go to their creating user, and `GET /ws/terminal/:id` and `GET /ws/file/:id` only check whether the supplied UUID exists. An authenticated RoleMember who obtains a live stream UUID from logs, browser history, referer data, or telemetry can attach to another user's terminal or file-manager session, read and write target-server files, and execute shell commands. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.10.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6xx-5vr8-p898 GHSA-q6xx-5vr8-p898 — Nezha vulnerable to cross-tenant terminal/file-manager session hijack via WebSocket stream UUID without ownership check 2026-10-06T17:48:22.609831+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/nezhahq/nezha

### Summary

In nezha **v1.14.13–v1.14.14** and **v2.0.0–v2.0.9**, the WebSocket endpoints `GET /ws/terminal/:id` and `GET /ws/file/:id` authenticate the caller only by the presence of a valid stream UUID, with no ownership check tying that UUID to the user who created the stream. Any authenticated dashboard user (including a `RoleMember`) who learns a live stream UUID can attach to the session and gain interactive shell access or full file-manager control on the target server — i.e. cross-tenant RCE.

This was silently fixed in commit [`6661d6a`](https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/commit/6661d6a7fc1c269f55c7f4e775082ad23fbe0f54) (2026-05-18, shipped in v2.0.10). At submission time no public CVE/GHSA covers this fix, so operators of v1.14.x and pre-v2.0.10 v2.x deployments have no signal that they are running vulnerable code.

### Details

**Stream allocation — `service/rpc/io_stream.go` (v2.0.9):**

```go func (s *NezhaHandler) CreateStream(streamId string) { s.ioStreamMutex.Lock() defer s.ioStreamMutex.Unlock()

s.ioStreams[streamId] = &ioStreamContext{ userIoConnectCh: make(chan struct{}), agentIoConnectCh: make(chan struct{}), } } ```

No creator is bound to the stream.

**Stream attach — `cmd/dashboard/controller/terminal.go` (v2.0.9):**

```go // @Router /ws/terminal/{id} [get] func terminalStream(c *gin.Context) (any, error) { streamId := c.Param("id") if _, err := rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.GetStream(streamId); err != nil {…