https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-10T01:00:25.514694+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-356475 EUVD-2026-356475 2026-10-10T01:00:25.517138+00:00 EUVD-2026-356475 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61842 fkie_cve-2026-61842 2026-10-10T01:00:25.517179+00:00

Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.2, the Grav Twig content sandbox permits grav.offsetGet('config') to return the raw configuration object and permits json_encode, print_r, yaml_encode, and string filters to serialize that object without passing through GravSecurityPolicy::checkMethodAllowed. A user with page-author permissions can render sandboxed content that exposes plugins.* configuration secrets, including SMTP credentials, API keys, and plugin database credentials. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.2.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mc5q-6hpj-rp7j GHSA-mc5q-6hpj-rp7j — Grav: Twig sandbox config exfiltration via grav.offsetGet + dump filter (CVE-2026-44738 bypass) 2026-10-10T01:00:25.517224+00:00

Affected: Packagist: getgrav/grav

### Summary

The Twig content sandbox replaces `config` with the redacted `SandboxConfig` facade and strips `Config::get`/`toArray` from the method allowlist (GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9), so editor content can't read config secrets via `config`. That's bypassable: `grav` is the raw container, `offsetget` is allow-listed on it, so `grav.offsetGet('config')` returns the real `Config`. The allow-listed filters `json_encode`/`print_r`/`yaml_encode` then serialize it at the PHP level, never hitting the sandbox method gate, dumping the whole config tree including every `plugins.*` secret (SMTP creds, API keys, plugin DB creds). Incomplete fix for GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9. `security.salt` does not leak (it lives outside config).

### Details

The documented path is blocked: `config` is the `SandboxConfig` facade (`Twig.php:660`) and the raw `Config`/`Data` method entries are stripped when `config_access` is false, so `{{ config.get(...) }}` returns the default and `{{ grav.offsetGet('config').get(...) }}` raises `SecurityNotAllowedMethodError`.

The bypass uses two allow-listed primitives the redaction doesn't cover:

1. `grav.offsetGet('config')` returns the raw `Config`. The `SandboxConfig` facade replaces only the `config` variable, not `grav['config']`; `offsetget` is allow-listed on `Grav\Common\Grav` in `system/config/security.yaml`. 2. `json_encode`/`print_r`/`yaml_encode` serialize the object inside the filter and never call `GravSecurityPolicy::checkMethodAllowed` (`GravSecurityPolicy…