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  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-06T11:10:20.404527+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-370444</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-370444</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T11:10:20.407109+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-370444</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-370444"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61599</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-61599</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T11:10:20.407142+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted path by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its top-level code (import side effects) — before the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and before any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is fail-open (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching. An unauthenticated WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = "&lt;any.importable.module&gt;.AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — any importable Python module by name. Version 1.0.7 fixes the issue with a fail-closed resolution gate (`djust._view_resolution.is_view_import_allowed`): a client view path resolves only if (a) its module is already loaded (`sys.modules` — so resolving runs no new code; URL-routed views loaded by URLconf at startup keep working with zero config) or (b) it matches `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` on a module-segment boundary (explicit opt-in for lazily-imported views). The gate runs before `__import_…</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61599"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7prp-2623-8g45</id>
    <title>GHSA-7prp-2623-8g45 — djust has an unauthenticated arbitrary module import via the WebSocket/SSE view-mount path</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T11:10:20.407190+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: djust</p>
<p>### Impact
The djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a **client-supplied dotted path** by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its **top-level code (import side effects)** — *before* the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and *before* any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is **fail-open** (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching.</p>
<p>An **unauthenticated** WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = "&lt;any.importable.module&gt;.AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — **any importable Python module by name**.</p>
<p>**Consequences:** server-side execution of arbitrary importable modules' import-time side effects by an unauthenticated client (effectively RCE-by-proxy on any host that has a side-effectful importable module), denial of service (import bombs / expensive dependency trees), and a module/class **enumeration oracle** via distinct error strings.</p>
<p>Reproduced end-to-end: an unauthenticated `WebsocketCommunicator` `mount` frame with the allowlist unset imported and executed a sentinel non-LiveView module before the "not a LiveView subclass" rejection.</p>
<p>### Af…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7prp-2623-8g45"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4038</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-4038 — djust has an unauthenticated arbitrary module import via the WebSocket/SSE view-mount path</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T11:10:20.407255+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: djust</p>
<p>### Impact
The djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a **client-supplied dotted path** by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its **top-level code (import side effects)** — *before* the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and *before* any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is **fail-open** (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching.</p>
<p>An **unauthenticated** WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = "&lt;any.importable.module&gt;.AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — **any importable Python module by name**.</p>
<p>**Consequences:** server-side execution of arbitrary importable modules' import-time side effects by an unauthenticated client (effectively RCE-by-proxy on any host that has a side-effectful importable module), denial of service (import bombs / expensive dependency trees), and a module/class **enumeration oracle** via distinct error strings.</p>
<p>Reproduced end-to-end: an unauthenticated `WebsocketCommunicator` `mount` frame with the allowlist unset imported and executed a sentinel non-LiveView module before the "not a LiveView subclass" rejection.</p>
<p>### Af…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-4038"/>
  </entry>
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