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EUVD-2026-338098

2026-10-06T09:02:53.382580+00:00

EUVD-2026-338098

fkie_cve-2026-61449

2026-10-06T09:02:53.382631+00:00

Grav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry's ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()['size']) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.

GHSA-8h9x-89f2-m7x3 — Grav: Decompression-bomb size cap bypassed by forged ZIP size in ZipArchiver/Installer

2026-10-06T09:02:53.382686+00:00

Affected: Packagist: getgrav/grav

### Summary

The decompression-bomb bound added in 2.0.1 (commit 1c1003c) sums `ZipArchive::statIndex($i)['size']` and rejects an archive whose declared uncompressed total exceeds `system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size` (default 1 GiB) before extracting (`ZipArchiver.php:77-86`; same logic in `GPM\Installer::unZip` at `Installer.php:228-238`). `statIndex()['size']` is the uncompressed size declared in the ZIP central directory, which is attacker-forgeable and is not checked against the actual inflated stream. An archive declaring 1 byte per entry passes the cap while `extractTo()` writes the real (large) content. The entry-count and nesting-depth caps count real structure and still hold; only the size dimension is defeated, so the disk-fill / inode-exhaustion case the bound targets is not prevented. Incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.

### Details

`extract()`/`unZip()` validate every entry up front, then call `Folder::create` + `extractTo`. The size check is:

```php $totalSize += (int) $stat['size']; // declared central-directory size if ($maxSize > 0 && $totalSize > $maxSize) { ... reject ... } ```

`$stat['size']` is read from the central directory, which the archive author writes. libzip does not cross-check declared-vs-actual size during `extractTo`, so a forged-small value passes the gate and the real stream inflates to disk. The `max_files` (entry count) and `max_depth` (entry-name segments) checks are not forgeable this way.

### PoC

Build a 10 KiB…