PraisonAI versions before 4.6.78 contain an allowlist bypass vulnerability in shell command execution that allows attackers to execute restricted commands via find's built-in -exec, -execdir, and -delete actions. Attackers can craft find commands with these built-in actions to read blocked files, delete files, or execute non-allowlisted binaries without triggering shell metacharacter filters.

Affected: PyPI: praisonai

### Summary

The shell command execution hardening introduced in PraisonAI npm 1.7.2 / Python 4.6.58 to fix GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj (utility-tools shell chaining) and GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 (SandboxExecutor chaining) can be bypassed via `find`'s built-in `-exec` action.

The fix blocks shell metacharacters (`` ;|&`><$()${} ``) and uses `spawn()` with `shell: false`. However, `find` remains in the safe command allowlist, and its `-exec ... {} +` action executes commands without shell metacharacters — the `+` batch terminator replaces the blocked `;` terminator. The same gap exists in 4 parallel implementations (verified by source inspection of each).

### Details

**Root cause**: Each of the four implementations validates the **first token** of the command against an allowlist or blocklist, then passes the remaining tokens as arguments to `spawn()`/`subprocess.Popen()` with `shell: false`. Shell metacharacter injection is indeed blocked.

However, `find` is a Unix command with **built-in execution actions**: `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-ok`, `-okdir`. These actions are interpreted by `find` itself, not by the shell. They execute programs or delete files without shell metacharacters (verified: the payload `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` passes the regex at line 240 of utility-tools.ts):

``` find /path -exec <command> {} + ```

The `+` terminator (batch mode) avoids `;` which IS blocked by the metacharacter regex.

**Affected components** (4 implementation…