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  <updated>2026-10-06T16:35:12.408783+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357434</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-357434</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T16:35:12.454629+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-357434</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357434"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59992</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-59992</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T16:35:12.454667+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to next-tinacms-s3 23.0.4, next-tinacms-dos 23.0.4, next-tinacms-azure 14.0.4, and next-tinacms-cloudinary 26.0.4, the first-party production media adapters pass attacker-controlled object keys to storage SDK upload and delete operations without enforcing the operator's configured mediaRoot. In packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts, createMediaHandler accepts req.query.key for a signed PutObject URL and the DELETE path uses req.query.media as the DeleteObjectCommand key. The same missing key-boundary check exists in packages/next-tinacms-dos/src/handlers.ts, packages/next-tinacms-azure/src/handlers.ts, and packages/next-tinacms-cloudinary/src/handlers.ts. An authenticated CMS editor can therefore create or delete objects anywhere the deployment's storage credential can reach, including other tenants' or non-media objects. These issues are fixed in next-tinacms-s3 23.0.4, next-tinacms-dos 23.0.4, next-tinacms-azure 14.0.4, and next-tinacms-cloudinary 26.0.4.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59992"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4</id>
    <title>GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4 — Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapt…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T16:35:12.454709+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: next-tinacms-s3, npm: next-tinacms-dos, npm: next-tinacms-azure, npm: next-tinacms-cloudinary</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any logged-in CMS editor in a typical TinaCloud / self-hosted deployment — therefore has write and delete authority over the *entire* S3 bucket the IAM key can reach, even though the package documents `mediaRoot` as the place where editors are scoped. The same shape is present in `next-tinacms-dos`, `next-tinacms-azure`, and `next-tinacms-cloudinary`, so a single design mistake spans every first-party production media backend.</p>
<p>* Project: TinaCMS — first-party production media adapters (consumed by self-hosted Next.js sites and TinaCloud-backed deployments).
* Source reviewed: `tinacms/tinacms` @ `main` (`b56dad4`).
* Deployed artefact validated: `next-tinacms-s3@21.0.3` handler logic, exercised against `@aws-sdk/client-s3@3.665.x` via `aws-sdk-client-mock@4.1.0` (the AWS SDK signs the URL identically whether the bucket is real or mocked).
* Affected file(s):
  * `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4"/>
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