Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet in a single request by naming an arbitrarily high gas price.

When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including max_fee_per_gas and max_priority_fee_per_gas, without validating that they are within reasonable bounds. A malicious client embeds arbitrarily large values for these fields in the signed envelope. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The effective_gas_price billed against the fee-payer wallet is derived from the attacker-supplied ceilings, so the server pays those inflated per-gas rates out of its own wallet. A single crafted request can drain the wallet entirely, after which the server can no longer sponsor gas for legitimate payment requests.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet in a single request by naming an arbitrarily high gas price.

When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including max_fee_per_gas and max_priority_fee_per_gas, without validating that they are within reasonable bounds. A malicious client embeds arbitrarily large values for these fields in the signed envelope. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The effective_gas_price billed against the fee-payer wallet is derived from the attacker-supplied ceilings, so the server pays those inflated per-gas rates out of its own wallet. A single crafted request can drain the wallet entirely, after which the server can no longer sponsor gas for legitimate payment requests.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.