Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.6 before 0.10.0, _sanitize_proxy_path in backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py decoded proxy paths only eight times, allowing a nine-times percent-encoded ../ traversal value to pass normalization checks and be decoded by the upstream terminal server. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.

Affected: PyPI: open-webui

AI assistance was used to help inspect the code and prepare this report.

## Summary

The fix for GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv is incomplete in v0.9.6 and current main. `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` documents `_sanitize_proxy_path()` as decoding until stable, but the implementation stops after 8 `unquote()` passes. A 9x percent-encoded `../...` path parameter remains once-encoded after the loop, passes the `posixpath.normpath()` and `cleaned.startswith('..')` checks, and is forwarded to the configured terminal server. The upstream server then receives a decoded traversal path such as `/base/../admin/system`.

## Impact

A user who has access to an admin-configured terminal connection can bypass the terminal proxy path traversal guard and cause Open WebUI to forward requests with the configured terminal credentials and `X-User-Id` header to paths outside the intended normalized proxy path. For orchestrator-backed terminal connections the same sanitized path is placed under `/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}`, so the bypass can also target sibling or parent routes after upstream decoding. This is a bypass of the same terminal proxy boundary covered by GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv.

This does not require adding a malicious terminal server or convincing an administrator to weaken settings. The attacker only needs normal access to an existing configured terminal connection.

## Reproduction

The following standalone Python script mirrors the current sanitizer and uses a local aiohttp server a…

Affected: PyPI: open-webui

AI assistance was used to help inspect the code and prepare this report.

## Summary

The fix for GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv is incomplete in v0.9.6 and current main. `backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py` documents `_sanitize_proxy_path()` as decoding until stable, but the implementation stops after 8 `unquote()` passes. A 9x percent-encoded `../...` path parameter remains once-encoded after the loop, passes the `posixpath.normpath()` and `cleaned.startswith('..')` checks, and is forwarded to the configured terminal server. The upstream server then receives a decoded traversal path such as `/base/../admin/system`.

## Impact

A user who has access to an admin-configured terminal connection can bypass the terminal proxy path traversal guard and cause Open WebUI to forward requests with the configured terminal credentials and `X-User-Id` header to paths outside the intended normalized proxy path. For orchestrator-backed terminal connections the same sanitized path is placed under `/p/{policy_id}/{safe_path}`, so the bypass can also target sibling or parent routes after upstream decoding. This is a bypass of the same terminal proxy boundary covered by GHSA-r2wg-2mcr-66rv.

This does not require adding a malicious terminal server or convincing an administrator to weaken settings. The attacker only needs normal access to an existing configured terminal connection.

## Reproduction

The following standalone Python script mirrors the current sanitizer and uses a local aiohttp server a…