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  <updated>2026-10-06T12:53:53.691699+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335476</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-335476</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T12:53:53.737443+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-335476</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335476"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59149</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-59149</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T12:53:53.737477+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59149"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8wqc-v2q8-vff2</id>
    <title>GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2 — @Mockoon/commons-server: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T12:53:53.737519+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @mockoon/commons-server, npm: @mockoon/cli</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>A `FILE` response whose `filePath` embeds request data (e.g. `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by `getSafeFilePath` with `resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)`. That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a `../`-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>`packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts`, `getSafeFilePath` (line 2315). The static base is the text before the first `{{`, resolved to an absolute path; the parsed `filePath` is then bounded by a string-prefix check:</p>
<p>```ts
const staticBaseDir = staticBaseMatch ? resolve(staticBaseMatch[1]) : null;     // 2336
const parsedFilePath = TemplateParser({ ... request ... });                     // request-controlled
const resolvedPath = resolvePath(parsedFilePath);</p>
<p>if (isPathAbsolute) {
  if (!staticBaseDir || !resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)) {              // 2355
    throw new Error(`Access to absolute path outside of the original static base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
  }
} else if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(this.options.environmentDirectory)) {       // 2362
  throw new Error(`Access to relative path outside of the environment base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
}
```</p>
<p>With `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, `staticBaseDir = /srv/public`. A request `name=../public_backup/.env` res…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8wqc-v2q8-vff2"/>
  </entry>
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