https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-06T15:08:04.422590+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335487 EUVD-2026-335487 2026-10-06T15:08:04.472438+00:00 EUVD-2026-335487 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59148 fkie_cve-2026-59148 2026-10-06T15:08:04.472477+00:00

Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, Mockoon's admin API in commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts is mounted on the same Express listener as user-defined mock routes, enabled by default in shipped runtimes, serves Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * with write methods allowed, and has no authentication. Any unauthenticated caller who can reach the mock server port can read MOCKOON_* environment variables, write arbitrary process environment variables through /mockoon-admin/env-vars, rewrite mock route bodies, statuses, and headers through PUT /mockoon-admin/environment, read transaction logs and SSE streams, and purge state. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rqx4-3f6q-3x2v GHSA-rqx4-3f6q-3x2v — @Mockoon/commons-server: Unauthenticated admin API + wildcard CORS allows mock-state hijack and secret theft 2026-10-06T15:08:04.472521+00:00

Affected: npm: @mockoon/commons-server, npm: @mockoon/cli

## Summary

Mockoon's admin API ([`commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts`](https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/4375a8f/packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts)) is mounted on the same Express listener as the user-defined mock routes, **enabled by default** in every shipped runtime (commons-server, CLI, serverless), serves **`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every endpoint with all HTTP methods allowed including PUT/POST/PATCH/DELETE/PURGE and `Content-Type` in `Access-Control-Allow-Headers`**, and has **zero authentication of any kind** (no token, no shared secret, no `MOCKOON_ADMIN_TOKEN` env var — searched the repo, returns zero hits).

Any unauthenticated caller who can reach the mock server's port (default `0.0.0.0:3000`) can:

- Read every `MOCKOON_*` env var used by the operator as secret material in templates (`getEnvVar` helper). - **Write arbitrary process env vars (no prefix check on the WRITE path)** — poison operator's `MOCKOON_API_KEY`, `MOCKOON_JWT_SECRET`, …, or write process-level vars like `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` that the surrounding runtime consumes. - **Rewrite every mock route's body / status / headers in-runtime** via `PUT /mockoon-admin/environment` — downstream consumers (frontend dev-server, CI test suite, integration partner) receive attacker-controlled responses and headers including `Set-Cookie`, `Location`, `Content-Security-Policy`, etc. - Read transaction logs / SSE stream (consumer's request bodies + auth headers in cle…