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EUVD-2026-338964

2026-10-05T11:38:40.632777+00:00

EUVD-2026-338964

fkie_cve-2026-58481

2026-10-05T11:38:40.632813+00:00

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list. A sibling directory that merely shares a name prefix (e.g. `/srv/app-evil` vs base `/srv/app`) is no longer treated as in-scope.

GHSA-jvcm-f35g-w78p — Network-AI: AgentRuntime sandbox path-prefix checks allow file access outside the configured base directory

2026-10-05T11:38:40.632846+00:00

Affected: npm: network-ai

### Summary `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`.

An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1. Severity: Medium, CVSS 3.1 vector `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N`.

### Details The vulnerable containment check is in `lib/agent-runtime.ts`:

```ts resolvePath(filePath: string): string | null { const normalized = normalize(filePath); const absolute = isAbsolute(normalized) ? normalized : join(this.config.basePath, normalized); const resolved = resolve(absolute);

// Traversal check if (!resolved.startsWith(this.config.basePath)) return null; return resolved; } ```

`startsWith()` is not path-boundary-aware. If `this.config.basePath` is `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox`, then `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt` also starts with `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` despite being outside the sandbox.

The same pattern appears in `SandboxPolicy.isPathAllowed()` for allowed and blocked paths. `FileAccessor.read()`, `FileAccessor.write()`, and `FileAccessor.list()` rely on these checks before I/…