https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-05T14:15:39.658226+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343454 EUVD-2026-343454 2026-10-05T14:15:39.707109+00:00 EUVD-2026-343454 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58263 fkie_cve-2026-58263 2026-10-05T14:15:39.707147+00:00

Jodit Editor is a WYSIWYG editor with a built-in file browser & image editor. In versions prior to 4.12.28, the built-in clean-html sanitizer can be bypassed by a MathML/<style> carrier that hides a dangerous element from the sanitizer's element walk, so a no-interaction event handler survives into the editor value, potentially causing Mutation XSS. When an application supplies attacker-influenced HTML to the editor's value-set or insertion paths, the sanitized output still contains a live <img ... onload=...> (or another non-onerror handler such as onfocus). A consumer that renders that output (element.innerHTML = editor.value) executes the handler with no user interaction. This issue has been fixed in version 4.12.28.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rxcw-mc6f-6hr3 GHSA-rxcw-mc6f-6hr3 — Jodit Editor: Mutation XSS in jodit clean-html via a MathML/style rawtext carrier 2026-10-05T14:15:39.707184+00:00

Affected: npm: jodit

### Summary jodit's built-in `clean-html` sanitizer can be bypassed by a MathML/`<style>` carrier that hides a dangerous element from the sanitizer's element walk, so a no-interaction event handler survives into the editor value. When an application supplies attacker-influenced HTML to the editor's value-set or insertion paths, the sanitized output still contains a live `<img ... onload=...>` (or another non-`onerror` handler such as `onfocus`). A consumer that renders that output (`element.innerHTML = editor.value`) executes the handler with no user interaction. This is a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability, confirmed live on the shipped `es2021/jodit.min.js` for 4.12.25 and the latest 4.12.27 (in Chromium via a client-side `innerHTML` consumer, and in Firefox via server-rendered / document-context output; see the cross-browser note under Proof of concept).

### Details The bypass exploits the order in which `clean-html` parses, walks, and re-serializes the value.

1. On the value-set path, the `clean-html` plugin handles `:beforeSetNativeEditorValue` (`src/plugins/clean-html/clean-html.ts:116`), parsing the value into an inert document: `sandBox.innerHTML = data.value`.

2. In that parse, the source nesting `math > mtext > table > mglyph > style` triggers MathML text-integration-point and foster-parenting rules: the `<img>` is parsed as text inside `<style>` (rawtext), not as an element. The `<table>` is foster-parented out, and the `<mglyph>` MathML text-integration…