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  <updated>2026-10-06T11:31:02.352420+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368513</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-368513</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T11:31:02.407610+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-368513</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368513"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57141</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-57141</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T11:31:02.407648+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.7.2, the codeMode tool in src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts executes model-generated JavaScript with new Function() and with(sandbox), while a regular-expression blocklist can be bypassed with Function('return this')() to recover the global object and by constructing the child_process module name dynamically. An attacker who can influence the code argument can access host process capabilities, read or write files, obtain environment credentials, and execute operating-system commands with the PraisonAI process privileges. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57141"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p69m-4f92-2v84</id>
    <title>GHSA-p69m-4f92-2v84 — PraisonAI: Remote Code Execution via Sandbox Escape in `codeMode` Tool</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T11:31:02.407683+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: praisonai</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The `codeMode` tool in `src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts` uses `new Function()` with a `with(sandbox)` pattern to execute LLM-generated code. The blocklist-based "sandbox" can be trivially bypassed via `Function('return this')()` to recover the global object, followed by `global.require()` with string concatenation to evade the blocklist regex. This allows full arbitrary code execution on the host system. This affects all deployments where the code-mode tool is enabled for agents.
## Details
**Vulnerable code (lines 187–191):**
```typescript
const fn = new Function(
  'sandbox',
  `with (sandbox) { ${code} }`
);
const result = fn(sandbox);
```</p>
<p>The `code` parameter comes from LLM tool call arguments (the `execute` method at line 104). Before execution, a regex-based blocklist is applied (lines 108–136):</p>
<p>```typescript
const blockedPatterns = [
  /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/,
  /require\s*\(\s*['"]fs['"]\s*\)/,
  /import\s+.*from\s+['"]child_process['"]/,
  /process\.exit/,
  /eval\s*\(/,
];
```</p>
<p>**Three fundamental weaknesses:**</p>
<p>1. **`with(sandbox)` does not provide isolation.** The `with` statement in JavaScript adds an object to the scope chain but does NOT prevent accessing the global object. The sandbox object sets `process: undefined` and `require: undefined`, but these are recovered via the global scope:
   ```javascript
   const g = Function('return this')();
   g.require('child_' + 'process')
   ```</p>
<p>2. **Blocklist evasion…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p69m-4f92-2v84"/>
  </entry>
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