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  <updated>2026-10-06T18:11:36.889677+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-370506</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-370506</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T18:11:36.952761+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-370506</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-370506"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57138</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-57138</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T18:11:36.952803+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.4.0 until 1.7.2, codeMode in src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts executes untrusted JavaScript with new Function() inside with(sandbox) and relies on a small source-code blocklist plus shadowed process and require properties. Code can use ({}).constructor.constructor to recover the real Function constructor, obtain process and process.mainModule.require, and reach host filesystem and subprocess APIs despite the advertised sandbox. Attackers who control codeMode input can read secrets, modify files, execute commands, or exhaust the host process. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57138"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vmmj-pfw7-fjwp</id>
    <title>GHSA-vmmj-pfw7-fjwp — npm PraisonAI codeMode sandbox escape via Function constructor</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T18:11:36.952841+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: praisonai</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The published npm package `praisonai` exports a TypeScript built-in tool named `codeMode`. The package describes this tool as executing code in a sandboxed environment, marks its capability as `sandbox: true`, and registers it through the public tools facade.</p>
<p>The implementation does not create an isolation boundary. It applies a small regular-expression blocklist, sets `process` and `require` to `undefined` inside a plain JavaScript object, and then executes attacker-controlled code with the host process `new Function` constructor:</p>
<p>```text
const fn = new Function('sandbox', `with (sandbox) { ${code} }`);
const result = fn(sandbox);
```</p>
<p>Because this runs in the host V8 context, code inside `codeMode` can use the JavaScript prototype chain to recover the real `Function` constructor:</p>
<p>```text
({}).constructor.constructor('return process')()
```</p>
<p>From a normal CommonJS application script, the recovered `process` object exposes `process.mainModule.require`. That bypasses the explicit `require('fs')` and `require('child_process')` controls and allows host filesystem access and subprocess execution from code that was supposed to be sandboxed.</p>
<p>## Technical Details</p>
<p>Current-head source says `codeMode` is a built-in package tool and explicitly advertises a sandbox boundary:</p>
<p>```text
src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts
  13: description: 'Execute code that can import and use other tools in a sandboxed environment',
  24: capabilities: {
  25:   sandbox: tru…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vmmj-pfw7-fjwp"/>
  </entry>
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