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  <updated>2026-10-07T02:40:09.927400+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368479</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-368479</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T02:40:09.988932+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-368479</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368479"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57137</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-57137</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T02:40:09.988972+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.4.0 until 1.7.2, createAgentLoop() in src/praisonai-ts/src/ai/agent-loop.ts passes executable tools to generateText() before invoking the onToolCall approval callback. Because the wrapped AI SDK executes tool handlers during generation, a callback that returns false records tool_rejected only after the denied tool has already produced side effects and populated toolResults. Applications using onToolCall as a human or policy approval boundary can therefore execute rejected file, command, API, or data-modifying operations. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57137"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2w2-v7j6-xqm4</id>
    <title>GHSA-h2w2-v7j6-xqm4 — npm PraisonAI AgentLoop onToolCall approval runs after tool execution</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T02:40:09.989007+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: praisonai</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The published npm package `praisonai` exports `createAgentLoop()`, whose `onToolCall` callback is documented and exampled as an approval hook. The implementation calls PraisonAI's `generateText()` wrapper with the caller's executable tools first, receives `toolResults`, and only then calls `onToolCall()`.</p>
<p>Because AI SDK `generateText()` executes tools with an `execute` function as part of the generation call, `onToolCall` can deny a tool only after the sensitive side effect has already happened. PraisonAI then returns `finishReason: "tool_rejected"`, which is a false security signal: the rejected tool already ran.</p>
<p>The PoV is deterministic and local-only. It uses mock AI SDK modules, no live model call, no API key, and no network target. The tool increments an in-memory counter rather than touching the filesystem or executing commands.</p>
<p>## Technical Details</p>
<p>In `src/praisonai-ts/src/ai/agent-loop.ts`, the public config says:</p>
<p>```ts
/** On tool call callback (for approval) */
onToolCall?: (toolCall: ToolCallInfo) =&gt; Promise&lt;boolean&gt;;
```</p>
<p>The inline approval example also asks a user for approval and returns the decision:</p>
<p>```ts
onToolCall: async (toolCall) =&gt; {
  const approved = await askUserForApproval(toolCall);
  return approved;
}
```</p>
<p>However, `AgentLoop.step()` calls `generateText()` with the executable tools before invoking `onToolCall`:</p>
<p>```ts
const result = await generateText({
  model: this.config.model,
  messages: this.messages as any,
  tools: this.…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2w2-v7j6-xqm4"/>
  </entry>
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