PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.5.1 until 1.7.2, the shell() helper exported from src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts checks only the first whitespace-delimited token against safeCommands and then passes the complete original string to child_process.exec(). A string that starts with an allowed read-only command can append a second non-allowlisted command through shell syntax, allowing arbitrary command execution with the PraisonAI process privileges. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.

Affected: npm: praisonai

## Summary

The published npm package `praisonai` ships `dist/tools/utility-tools.js`, which exports a `shell(command)` helper described in source as:

```text Execute shell command (safe version - read-only commands) ```

The helper attempts to enforce a safe read-only command allowlist by checking only the first whitespace-delimited token:

```ts const safeCommands = ['ls', 'cat', 'head', 'tail', 'wc', 'grep', 'find', 'echo', 'date', 'pwd', 'which']; const firstWord = command.split(/\s+/)[0];

if (!safeCommands.includes(firstWord)) { return { success: false, error: `Command not allowed: ${firstWord}` }; } ```

It then passes the entire original string to Node `child_process.exec()`:

```ts const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command, { timeout: 5000 }); ```

Because `exec()` runs the command through a shell, a command string that starts with an allowed command can append a second non-allowlisted command with shell metacharacters. For example, direct `printf <marker>` is rejected, but `echo ok; printf <marker>` is accepted and executes `printf`.

This bypasses the helper's safe-command policy and allows arbitrary shell commands to run with the PraisonAI process privileges when an application, agent, or integration exposes this helper to lower-trust users, prompts, model output, or plugin/tool input.

The PoV is deterministic and local-only. It installs only the npm package, runs harmless marker commands, and does not contact any live service after installation.…