9Router is an AI router & token saver. In 0.5.4 and earlier, the POST /api/auth/oidc/test endpoint in src/app/api/auth/oidc/test/route.js passes the user-controlled issuerUrl parameter to fetchOidcDiscovery() in src/lib/auth/oidc.js without restricting private or loopback destinations, allowing unauthenticated attackers when dashboard login is disabled to scan internal services and reflect OIDC discovery fields including token_endpoint and jwks_uri.

Affected: npm: 9router

### Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the 9Router dashboard via the `/api/auth/oidc/test` endpoint. The application accepts a user-controlled URL string through the `issuerUrl` parameter and performs an outbound HTTP request without validating if the destination IP belongs to a restricted internal network range.

Notably, this endpoint can be accessed without active session authentication (Unauthenticated), allowing any remote actor with network visibility to the dashboard API endpoints to trigger outbound infrastructure connections.

Depending on the state and response of the internal port targeted, this flaw exhibits two distinct behaviors:

1. **Port Scanning / Blind SSRF (Non-OIDC structures):** Probing internal ports that are closed or running non-HTTP/non-OIDC services (e.g., SSH, Databases) forces predictable application behavior changes (e.g., structural timeout or clear JSON parsing error messages like "Unexpected token..."), allowing internal network reconnaissance. 2. **Full Data Feed Manipulation (OIDC matching structures):** If the targeted internal service responds with a valid OpenID configuration document structure, the backend successfully processes, parses, and reflects the internal properties back to the client, confirming partial data control.

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### Vulnerable Code Details

- **Classification:** VE-Class 4 — OIDC SSRF via issuerUrl (Unauthenticated) - **File Path:** `src/app/api/auth/oidc/test/route.js` - **Vulnerab…