Nuxt before 4.4.7 (and the 3.x branch before 3.21.7) contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the NoScript component that writes slot content to innerHTML without escaping. Attackers can inject malicious scripts through untrusted data in NoScript slots, such as route.query parameters, which execute in the document context when the noscript tag is implicitly closed by script tags.

Affected: npm: nuxt

### Impact

Nuxt's globally registered `<NoScript>` component (from `@unhead/vue` head components, re-exported by Nuxt) wrote its default-slot content to the `innerHTML` of the `<noscript>` head tag, bypassing the HTML escaping that `{{ }}` interpolation normally applies in Vue templates.

Applications that placed untrusted, attacker-controllable data inside a `<NoScript>` slot, for example:

```vue <NoScript>{{ route.query.banner }}</NoScript> ```

would emit that value unescaped inside `<noscript>` in the server-rendered HTML. With scripting enabled, the HTML parser treats `<noscript>` content in `<head>` under the "in head noscript" insertion mode: any tag other than `link`, `meta`, `noframes`, or `style` implicitly closes `<noscript>` and is re-processed in the head. A payload such as `<script>...</script>` therefore escapes the element and executes in the document context.

Sibling head components (`<Style>`, `<Title>`) were not affected because they already routed slot text through the safe `textContent` path.

### Affected versions

All currently supported versions of `nuxt` that ship the `<NoScript>` global component.

### Patches

Fixed in `nuxt@4.4.7` (commit [`4b054e9d`](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/4b054e9d95f8daf366cb144b52782047c511a66e)) and backported to `nuxt@3.21.7` (commit [`7fea9fd6`](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/7fea9fd687f1dacbfb63db5fae5839896b017a0e)). The fix escapes `<NoScript>` slot content with `escapeHtml` from `@vue/shared` and wri…