Symfony UX is a JavaScript ecosystem for Symfony. From 2.32.0 before 2.36.1 and from 3.0.0 before 3.2.0, the ux:install console command installs files from a recipe kit by copying paths listed in a copy-files map, and because Path::isRelative() accepts paths like ../../../etc, a crafted or compromised kit can write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary locations or read local files outside the recipe directory. This issue is fixed in versions 2.36.1 and 3.2.0.

Affected: Packagist: symfony/ux-toolkit

### Description The `ux:install` console command installs files from a recipe kit by copying paths listed in a `copy-files` map. The only guard against malicious paths was `Path::isRelative()`, which returns `true` for paths like `../../../etc`. `Path::join()` then resolves the `..` segments without complaint, so the final path can escape the intended directory entirely. A crafted or compromised kit can therefore write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary locations on the developer's machine or CI runner.

Because the copy operation creates missing parent directories and can overwrite existing files silently (with `--force` or in non-interactive environments), an attacker who controls a kit can overwrite files such as controllers, git hooks, or `.env` to achieve code execution. The source side of `copy-files` is symmetrically affected, enabling local file reads outside the recipe directory.

### Resolution

The fix introduces an `Assert::pathDoesNotEscapeDirectory()` helper that rejects any `copy-files` source or destination path containing a `..` segment, regardless of whether `/` or `\` is used as the separator. This check is enforced in both `RecipeManifest` (which also guards the source Finder) and `File`. As a last line of defense, the installer re-verifies the fully resolved paths with `Path::isBasePath()` immediately before each filesystem read and write.

### Credits

Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and Hugo Alliaume for pr…