GeoLens is a self-hosted geospatial data catalog with semantic search, OGC and STAC APIs, and a map builder. Prior to 1.2.3, multiple read and link endpoints authorize only the resource named in the request URL and fail to re-authorize a second caller-influenced dataset reached through a relationship, map layer, VRT source, externalId lookup, or request body. When a public map references a private dataset, anonymous callers can use GET /maps/{id} and GET /maps/{id}/style.json to obtain the private layer's metadata, sampled values, or vector tiles. The style response can expose a replayable HMAC tile URL that is bound to neither a user nor a map. When a public source dataset has a relationship to a private target dataset, anonymous callers can use the dataset relationship APIs to enumerate the relationship and read rows from the private target's backing table. Anonymous callers can also use GET /collections/datasets/items with an externalId dataset UUID to obtain metadata for any private, restricted, or unpublished dataset because that lookup performs no visibility check. Authenticated users with the default editor role can mosaic another user's private raster into an owned VRT and read its pixels, and POST /ai/metadata/{summary,keywords,lineage,quality-statement} accepts a body-controlled dataset_id without a visibility check and returns private metadata and sample values. Pre-existing vrt_source_links also expose unauthorized member metadata and health unless each member is…

Affected: npm: @geolens/sdk, PyPI: geolens-cli, PyPI: geolens

### Summary

Multiple GeoLens read/link endpoints authorized only the resource named in the request URL (a map, a VRT, a source dataset, an AI request) and failed to re-authorize a **second, caller-influenced dataset** that the request reached through a relationship, layer reference, mosaic source, or request body. This "authorize the URL resource, read a *different* dataset un-re-authorized" pattern let callers read data from datasets they have no access to.

The most severe instances require **no authentication at all** (anonymous, network-only). Others require only the **default `editor` role** that any self-service signup / upload user receives.

All issues are fixed in **1.2.3**. There is no complete configuration workaround — upgrading is the only full remediation.

### Impact

Depending on the endpoint, an attacker can read, for datasets they cannot otherwise access:

- the dataset's **vector tile data** (actual feature geometries/attributes), - the dataset's **raster pixels**, - backing-table **rows**, - and **metadata** — table name, column schema, feature count, extent, source URL/filename, contacts, and **sampled row values**.

### Affected versions

All versions **prior to 1.2.3** (includes the published 1.0.0, 1.2.0, and 1.2.2 releases and their PyPI/npm/GHCR artifacts). Fixed in **1.2.3**.

### Findings

**1. Anonymous metadata + private vector-tile disclosure via public maps (PR #235)** `GET /maps/{id}` and `GET /maps/{id}/style.json` authorized the map but…

Affected: PyPI: geolens

### Summary

Multiple GeoLens read/link endpoints authorized only the resource named in the request URL (a map, a VRT, a source dataset, an AI request) and failed to re-authorize a **second, caller-influenced dataset** that the request reached through a relationship, layer reference, mosaic source, or request body. This "authorize the URL resource, read a *different* dataset un-re-authorized" pattern let callers read data from datasets they have no access to.

The most severe instances require **no authentication at all** (anonymous, network-only). Others require only the **default `editor` role** that any self-service signup / upload user receives.

All issues are fixed in **1.2.3**. There is no complete configuration workaround — upgrading is the only full remediation.

### Impact

Depending on the endpoint, an attacker can read, for datasets they cannot otherwise access:

- the dataset's **vector tile data** (actual feature geometries/attributes), - the dataset's **raster pixels**, - backing-table **rows**, - and **metadata** — table name, column schema, feature count, extent, source URL/filename, contacts, and **sampled row values**.

### Affected versions

All versions **prior to 1.2.3** (includes the published 1.0.0, 1.2.0, and 1.2.2 releases and their PyPI/npm/GHCR artifacts). Fixed in **1.2.3**.

### Findings

**1. Anonymous metadata + private vector-tile disclosure via public maps (PR #235)** `GET /maps/{id}` and `GET /maps/{id}/style.json` authorized the map but…