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EUVD-2026-362076

2026-10-02T10:44:09.159384+00:00

EUVD-2026-362076

fkie_cve-2026-54754

2026-10-02T10:44:09.159416+00:00

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, marketplace settlement in core/kapp/market/market.go reads MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage from the listing while reading asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage live at purchase time. An asset owner can create a valid listing and then use AssetTrigger UpdateRoyalties to make the combined referral and royalty percentages exceed the bid. executeBuyMarket pays referral and royalty amounts unconditionally while computeMarketOwnerAmount silently skips a nonpositive seller remainder, allowing MarketBuy, BuyItNow, or auction Claim settlement to credit more KLV or sale currency than the buyer paid. This can create unbacked currency and corrupt token supply integrity. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.

GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8 — Klever: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently ski…

2026-10-02T10:44:09.159451+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/klever-io/klever-go

## Summary

When a marketplace order is settled (`MarketBuy` / `BuyItNow`, and auction `Claim`), the buyer's payment is split three ways — **referral**, **royalties**, and the **seller (market-order owner) remainder**:

``` marketOwnerAmount = CurrentBid − referralAmount − royaltiesAmount ```

Referral and royalties are paid out **unconditionally**, but the seller remainder is only paid **when positive** (`computeMarketOwnerAmount` returns `Ok` and pays nothing when the amount is `<= 0`). When `referral% + royalty%` exceeds 100% of the bid, `marketOwnerAmount` goes **negative** and is silently skipped — so the marketplace pays out **more KLV / sale currency than the buyer paid in**, minting the difference out of thin air.

The combined ceiling `royalty% + referral% <= 100%` **is** checked once, at listing time (`Sell`). But the two percentages are sourced asymmetrically at settlement:

- **referral %** is **snapshotted** into the order at `Sell` (`MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage`); - **royalty %** is **never snapshotted** — it is read **live** from the asset at buy time (`asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage`).

So the listing-time invariant is a **time-of-check/time-of-use** guarantee only. After a valid listing, the asset owner raises the royalty `MarketPercentage` via `AssetTrigger → UpdateRoyalties`; at the next buy the live royalty plus the snapshotted referral exceed 100%, and the settlement mints the overflow. The minted funds land in attacker-controlled referral / r…