https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-13T06:28:56.406364+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343446 EUVD-2026-343446 2026-10-13T06:28:56.441618+00:00 EUVD-2026-343446 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54725 fkie_cve-2026-54725 2026-10-13T06:28:56.441654+00:00

vault-secrets-webhook is a Kubernetes mutating webhook that makes direct secret injection into Pods possible. Prior to 1.23.1, parseVaultConfig() in pkg/webhook/config.go accepts the vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr annotation, MutateConfigMap and MutateSecret call newVaultClient in pkg/webhook/webhook.go, and vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-serviceaccount can cause a ServiceAccount JWT to be sent to an attacker-controlled Vault address. This issue is fixed in version 1.23.1.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm — vault-addr annotation SSRF -- webhook makes outbound HTTP call to attacker URL during admission; vault-serviceaccount e… 2026-10-13T06:28:56.441688+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/bank-vaults/vault-secrets-webhook

## Summary

The vault-secrets-webhook reads the `vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr` annotation from any ConfigMap or Secret being admitted and uses it as the Vault server address without any validation or allowlist. When a ConfigMap or Secret contains a value prefixed with `vault:`, the webhook's admission handler synchronously calls the Vault API at the attacker-supplied address from inside the webhook process during the admission review. The webhook additionally grants `serviceaccounts/token:create` cluster-wide, and the `vault-serviceaccount` annotation controls which ServiceAccount's JWT is fetched and sent to that address. An attacker who can create ConfigMaps or Secrets in a watched namespace can cause the webhook process to make arbitrary outbound HTTP connections and exfiltrate ServiceAccount JWTs.

## Details

`parseVaultConfig()` at `pkg/webhook/config.go:102-107` reads `VaultAddrAnnotation` unconditionally into `vaultConfig.Addr`:

```go if value, ok := annotations[common.VaultAddrAnnotation]; ok { vaultConfig.Addr = value } ```

No URL scheme validation, no hostname allowlist, no RFC-1918 or link-local filter.

`MutateConfigMap` and `MutateSecret` at `pkg/webhook/configmap.go` and `pkg/webhook/secret.go` call `mw.newVaultClient(ctx, vaultConfig)` when the object contains at least one `vault:...` value. Inside `newVaultClient`, at `pkg/webhook/webhook.go:285`:

```go clientConfig.Address = vaultConfig.Addr ```

`vault.NewClientFromConfigWithContext` the…