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EUVD-2026-338463

2026-10-07T02:07:49.537588+00:00

EUVD-2026-338463

fkie_cve-2026-54526

2026-10-07T02:07:49.537619+00:00

Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. Prior to 3.7.15 and 4.0.6, the allow-list fix for CVE-2026-31892 is incomplete because workflow/util/merge.go ValidateUserOverrides and SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec walk only the top-level fields of WorkflowSpec via reflection, and WorkflowSpec.ArtifactGC is allow-listed wholesale; the struct behind that field, WorkflowLevelArtifactGC, has a PodSpecPatch sub-field whose contents flow unmodified into util.ApplyPodSpecPatch on the artifact-GC pod, the same sink the original fix closed for WorkflowSpec.PodSpecPatch, so a user submitting a Workflow under templateReferencing: Strict or Secure (against a referenced WorkflowTemplate that declares an output artifact and setting spec.artifactGC.strategy: OnWorkflowCompletion) can still inject an arbitrary strategic merge patch into the artifact-GC pod, including hostPath volumes, privileged: true, arbitrary image and command, and hostNetwork: true, defeating the stated purpose of Strict/Secure reference mode. This issue is fixed in versions 3.7.15 and 4.0.6.

GHSA-48p8-g2fx-3wwm — Argo Workflows: ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch bypasses Strict/Secure template reference allow-list (Incomplete fix for CVE-20…

2026-10-07T02:07:49.537653+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4, Go: github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3, Go: github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows

### Summary

The allow-list fix for CVE-2026-31892 (GHSA-3wf5-g532-rcrr), and its follow-up coverage of `hostNetwork`/`securityContext`/`serviceAccountName` in GHSA-3775-99mw-8rp4, is incomplete. `workflow/util/merge.go` `ValidateUserOverrides` / `SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec` walk only the top-level fields of `WorkflowSpec` via reflection. `WorkflowSpec.ArtifactGC` is allow-listed because admins want users to configure artifact garbage collection. The struct behind that field, `WorkflowLevelArtifactGC`, has a `PodSpecPatch` sub-field whose contents flow unmodified into `util.ApplyPodSpecPatch` on the artifact-GC pod - the same sink the original fix closed for `WorkflowSpec.PodSpecPatch`. A user submitting a Workflow under `templateReferencing: Strict` or `Secure` can therefore still inject an arbitrary strategic merge patch into the artifact-GC pod (hostPath volumes, `privileged: true`, arbitrary image and command, `hostNetwork: true`), defeating the stated purpose of Strict/Secure reference mode.

### Details

Locations in `main` at `4d9f021` (HEAD 2026-04-23):

Allow-list and reflection scope - `workflow/util/merge.go:19-60`:

```go var allowedUserOverrideFields = map[string]bool{ "Arguments": true, "Entrypoint": true, ... "ArtifactGC": true, // <-- allow-listed wholesale }

func ValidateUserOverrides(userSpec *wfv1.WorkflowSpec) error { v := reflect.ValueOf(userSpec).Elem() t := v.Type() zero := reflect.New(t).E…