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EUVD-2026-357057

2026-10-15T16:32:51.911477+00:00

EUVD-2026-357057

fkie_cve-2026-54491

2026-10-15T16:32:51.911513+00:00

Koel is a free, open-source music streaming solution. Prior to 9.7.1, outbound podcast and radio fetch paths perform a point-in-time App\Helpers\Network::isPublicHost() or isSafeUrl() check without pinning the validated address, and most paths lack redirect-hop validation and do not revalidate every redirect target. PhanAn\Poddle\Poddle::fromUrl(), PodcastService::getStreamableUrl(), PodcastService::isPodcastObsolete(), App\Rules\HasAudioContentType, and App\Rules\SafeUrl can therefore follow an attacker-controlled redirect to an internal address or connect after DNS rebinding changes a public resolution to a private one. These paths are reachable through podcast and radio APIs, including createPodcastChannel, createInternetRadioStation, refreshPodcasts, apiResource podcasts, and radio/stations, allowing an authenticated user to request internal services or cloud metadata and potentially receive parsed or streamed response content. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.1.

GHSA-6qvr-wjmv-v8mm — Koel: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-47260 — systemic SSRF in podcast & radio fetch paths

2026-10-15T16:32:51.911549+00:00

Affected: Packagist: phanan/koel

### Summary

The fix for **CVE-2026-47260** (v9.3.5) added an **initial** `isSafeUrl()` check to several fetchers (`synchronizeEpisodes`, `getStreamableUrl`, `AddRadioStation`, `EpisodePlayable`), but the **redirect-target validation** — the per-hop Guzzle `on_redirect` callback added in follow-up commit `be1e867` — was applied to **only one** path, `EpisodePlayable`. Every other server-side fetcher therefore has **only the initial check, which an HTTP 302 redirect to an internal address bypasses**, or no check at all. **DNS rebinding** (validation and connection resolve DNS separately, with no IP pinning) bypasses the initial check on every path.

An **authenticated, non-admin** user can thus cause the Koel server to issue requests to arbitrary internal / cloud-metadata endpoints (SSRF) by supplying a URL on an attacker-controlled host that 302-redirects to an internal address.

> Note: commit `be1e867` shows the redirect-based SSRF vector was recognised, but the redirect defense was applied to a single call site rather than generalised — so the class survives in the sibling paths below.

### Details — Root cause

`App\Helpers\Network::isPublicHost()` / `isSafeUrl()` perform a **point-in-time host check** with no pinning of the resolved IP, and **per-redirect-hop** re-validation exists **only** in `App\Values\Podcast\EpisodePlayable` (the `on_redirect` callback from commit `be1e867`). Consequently every other fetcher is exposed to (1) **redirect SSRF** — initial URL passes…